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Abstract
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted
widely for modeling adversarial interactions. With increas-
ing size of the applications of SSGs, scalability of equilib-
rium computation is an important research problem. While
prior research has made progress with regards to scalability,
many real world problems cannot be solved satisfactorily yet
as per current requirements; these include the deployed fed-
eral air marshals (FAMS) application and the threat screening
(TSG) problem at airports. Further, these problem domains
are inherently limited by NP hardness shown in prior litera-
ture. We initiate a principled study of approximations in zero-
sum SSGs. Our contribution includes the following: (1) a uni-
fied model of SSGs called adversarial randomized allocation
(ARA) games that allows studying most SSGs in one model,
(2) hardness of approximation results for zero-sum ARA, as
well as for the sub-problem of allocating federal air marshal
(FAMS) and threat screening problem (TSG) at airports, (3)
an approximation framework for zero-sum ARA with prov-
able approximation guarantees and (4) experiments demon-
strating the significant scalability of up to 1000x improve-
ment in runtime with an acceptable 5% solution quality loss.
1 Introduction
The Stackelberg Security Game (SSG) model (and vari-
ants) has been widely adopted in literature and in practice
to model the defender-adversary interaction in various do-
mains (Tambe 2011; Jiang et al. 2013; Blum, Haghtalab,
and Procaccia 2014; Guo et al. 2016; Blocki et al. 2013;
Basilico, Gatti, and Amigoni 2009; Munoz de Cote et al.
2013). Over time SSGs have been used to model increas-
ingly large and complex real world problems, hence an im-
portant research direction in SSGs is the study of scalable
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) computation algo-
rithms, both theoretically and empirically. The scalability
challenge has led to the development of a number of novel
algorithmic techniques that compute the SSE of SSGs (see
related work).
However, scalability continues to remain a pertinent chal-
lenge across many SSG applications. There are real world
problems that even the best known approaches fail to scale
up to, such as threat screening games (TSGs) and the Federal
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Air Marshals (FAMS) domain. The TSG model is used to al-
locate screening resources to screenees at airports and solves
the problem for every hour (24 times a day). Yet, recent
state-of-the-art approach for airport threat screening (Brown
et al. 2016) (TSG) scales only up to 110 flights per hour
whereas 220 flights can depart per hour from the Atlanta Air-
port (FAA 2014). The FAMS problem is to allocate federal
air marshals to US based flights in order to protect against hi-
jacking attacks. Again, the best optimal solver for FAMS in
literature (Jain et al. 2010) solves problems up to 200 flights
(FAMS is an already deployed application), whereas on av-
erage 3500 international flights depart from USA daily (US-
DOT 2016). Further, these problems are fundamentally lim-
ited by the hardness of computing the exact solution.
To overcome the computational hardness, and also pro-
vide practical scalability we investigate approximation tech-
niques for zero-sum SSGs. Towards that end, our first contri-
bution in this paper is a unified model of SSGs that we name
adversarial randomized allocation (ARA) games. ARA cap-
tures a large class of SSGs which we call linearizable SSGs
(defined later) and it includes TSGs and FAMS. Further, the
ARA model provides a unified characterization of imple-
mentability of marginal strategies that has been studied in
separate papers in literature.
Our second contribution is a set of hardness of approxi-
mation results for the class of zero-sum ARA problems, and
also for sub-classes such as TSGs. For ARA, we show that
the ARA equilibrium computation problem and the defender
best response problem in the given ARA game have the same
hardness of approximation property and in the worst case
ARA is not approximable. Further, we show that even the
restricted set of ARA problems given by FAMS and TSGs
are both hard to approximate to any logarithmic factor.
Our third contribution is a general approximation frame-
work for finding the SSE for zero-sum ARAs. As an ap-
plication, we demonstrate the use of this framework for
FAMS and TSGs. The approximation approach combines
techniques from dependent sampling (Tsai et al. 2010) with
domain specific heuristics to yield simple to implement ap-
proximation algorithms. We provide theoretical approxima-
tion bounds for both FAMS and TSGs.
Finally, as our fourth contribution, we demonstrate via
experiments that we can solve FAMS problem up to 3500
flights and TSG problems up to 280 flights with runtime im-
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provements up to 1000x. Moreover, the loss for FAMS prob-
lems is less than 5% with increasing flights and for TSGs is
less than 1.5% across all cases. Hence, our results provide a
practical and simple framework for approximating zero-sum
SSGs (more generally ARAs) with provable approximation
guarantees. Moreover, our approach enables solving the real
world FAMS and airport screening problem satisfactorily for
a US wide deployment. All full proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Work
Two major approaches to scale up in SSGs include incre-
mental strategy generation (ISG) and use of marginals. ISG
uses a master slave decomposition, with the slave provid-
ing a defender or attacker best response (Jain et al. 2010).
All these approaches are fundamentally limited by the com-
putational complexity of finding an exact solution (Ko-
rzhyk, Conitzer, and Parr 2010; Xu 2016) and thus in some
cases ISG has included approximation of defender/attacker
best responses (Guo et al. 2016; Gan, An, and Vorob-
eychik 2015). Use of marginals and directly sampling
from marginals while faster suffers from the issue of non-
implementable (invalid) marginal solutions (Kiekintveld et
al. 2009; Tsai et al. 2010). Fixing the non-implementability
again runs into complexity barriers (Brown et al. 2016).
Combinations of marginals and ISG approaches (Bosˇansky´
et al. 2015) and gradient descent based approach (Amin,
Singh, and Wellman 2016) have also been used. Our study
stands in contrast to these approaches as we aim to approxi-
mate the SSE and not compute it exactly, providing a viable
alternative to ISG and bypassing the non-implementability
of marginals approach. Another line of work uses regret
minimization and endgame solving techniques (Moravcˇı´k
et al. 2017; Brown and Sandholm 2017) for approximately
solving large scale sequential zero sum games. Our game
does not have a sequential structure and the large action
space (1033 for TSG and 1014 for FAMS; see appendix for
the calculation) precludes using a standard no-regret learn-
ing approach.
Our approximation approach is inspired by randomized
rounding (RR) (Raghavan and Thompson 1987). However,
distinct from standard RR, our problem has equality con-
straints. Previous work on RR with equality constraints
address only equality constraints (Gandhi et al. 2006) or
works on obtaining an integral solution given an approxi-
mate fractional solution within a polyhedron with integral
vertices (Ageev and Sviridenko 2004; Chekuri, Vondra´k,
and Zenklusen 2009). However, our initial fractional solu-
tion may not lie in an integral polyhedron, and we have both
equality and inequality constraints. Thus, we provide an ap-
proach that exploits the disjoint structure of equality con-
straints in TSGs in order to use previous work on comb sam-
pling (Tsai et al. 2010) and then alters the output (Bansal et
al. 2012) to handle both equality and inequality constraints.
While there exists other hardness of approximation re-
sults for other Stackelberg security game like models (Guo
et al. 2016) that rely on the graph characteristics of those
domains, our hardness of approximation results are the first
such results for the simple FAMS and the recent TSG secu-
rity games problem.
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Figure 1: Three illustrations: (a) ARA with assets A,B,C and
objects O,P,Q with 3 example assignment constraints (shown as
dashed lines) with upper bound 1 on the columns. Shown also
is an assignment that satisfies these constraints. (b) FAMS prob-
lem with 2 flights, 3 schedules and 3 FAMS. S1 and S2 share one
flight and so do S2 and S3. The two assignment constraints (for the
two flights) with upper bound 1 are represented by the two dashed
lines. Additional constraints are present on each row, shown on the
right of the matrix. The attacker chooses a flight to attack, hence
the dashed lines also show the index set T of targets. A sample
pure strategy fills the column entries. (c) TSG with the two assign-
ment constraints (resource capacity) with upper bound 7 for XRay
and 15 for Metal Detector (MD) represented by the two dashed
lines. Additional equality constraints denoting the number of pas-
sengers in each passenger category (R,F) are present on each col-
umn, shown on the bottom of the matrix. A passenger category
(column) is made from risk and flight. An adversary of typeR1 can
only choose the first column R1, F1 and R2 can choose from the
other two columns. Thus, the index set T for targets corresponds to
columns. A sample pure strategy fills the column entries.
3 Model and Notation
We present a general abstract model of adversarial random-
ized allocation (ARA). ARA captures all linearizable SSGs,
which is defined as those in which the probability ct of de-
fending a target t is linear in the defender mixed strategy.
The ARA game model is a Stackelberg game model in which
the defender moves first by committing to a randomized al-
location and the adversary best responds. We start by pre-
senting the defender’s action space. There are k defense as-
sets that need to be allocated to n objects to be defended.
In this model, assets and objects are abstract entities and
do not represent actual resources and targets in a security
games. We will instantiate this abstract model with concrete
examples of FAMS and TSG in the following sub-sections.
Defender’s randomized allocation of resources: The al-
location can be represented as a k×nmatrix with the (i, j)th
entry xi,j denoting the allocation of asset i to object j, and
each xi,j ≥ 0. There is a set of assignment constraints
on the entries of the matrix. Each assignment constraint is
characterized by a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} × {1, . . . , n} of in-
dexes of the matrix and the constraint is given by ns ≤∑
(i,j)∈S xi,j ≤ NS , where ns, NS are non-negative inte-
gers. We will refer to each assignment constraint as S. Also
for sake of brevity, we denote the vector of all the entries in
the matrix as x and
∑
(i,j)∈S xi,j as x[S].
Pure strategies of the defender are integral allocations that
respect the assignment constraints, i.e., integral x’s such
that nS ≤ x[S] ≤ NS for all assignment constraints S.
See Figure 1 for an illustrative example of the assignment
constraints and a valid pure strategy. Let the set of pure
strategies be P and we will refer to a single pure strategy
as P. On the other hand, the space of marginal strategies
MgS are those x’s that satisfy the assignment constraints
nS ≤ x[S] ≤ NS for all S; note that marginal strategies
need not be integral.
Mixed strategies are probability distributions over pure
strategies, e.g., probabilities a1, . . . , am (
∑
m am = 1) over
pure strategies P1, . . . ,Pm. An expected (marginal) repre-
sentation of a mixed strategy is x =
∑
m amPm. Thus,
the space of mixed strategies is exactly the convex hull of
P , denoted as conv(P ). Typically, the space of marginal
strategies is larger than conv(P ), i.e., conv(P ) ⊂ MgS,
hence all marginal strategies are not implementable as mixed
strategies. The conditions under which all marginal strate-
gies are implementable (or not) has an easy interpretation
in our model (see the implementability results later in this
section).
Adversary’s action: The presence of an adversary sets
our model (and SSGs) apart from a randomized alloca-
tion problem (Budish et al. 2013) and makes ARA a game
problem. The attacker’s action is to choose a target to at-
tack. In our abstract formulation a target t is given by a
set T ⊂ {1, . . . , k} × {1, . . . , n} of indexes of the allo-
cation matrix. In order to capture linearizable SSGs, the
probability of successfully defending an attack on target t is
ct =
∑
i,j∈T wi,jxi,j where wi,j’s are given constants such
that wi,j ≤ 1/maxx∈conv(P )
∑
i,j∈T xi,j . The constraint
on wi,j ensures that ct ≤ 1. We assume the total number
of targets in polynomial in the size of the allocation matrix.
Then, as is standard for SSGs, the defender utility for de-
fender strategy x and attacker strategy t is given by the ex-
pected value
Ud(x, t) = ctU
t
s + (1− ct)U tu
where U ts (resp. U
t
u) is the defender’s utility when target t is
successfully (resp. unsuccessfully) defended. As we restrict
ourselves to zero-sum games, the attacker’s utility is nega-
tion of the above1.
The problem of Strong Stackelberg equilibrium computa-
tion can be stated as: maxx,z,ai z subject to z ≤ Ud(x, t) ∀t
and x =
∑
i:Pi∈P aiPi, where the last constraint represents
x ∈ conv(P ). Note that the inputs to the SSE problem are
the assignment constraints, and the number of pure strate-
gies can be exponential in this input. Thus, even though the
above optimization is a LP, its size can be exponential in
the input to the SSE computation problem. However, using
the marginal strategies MgS instead of the mixed strategies
conv(P ) results in a polynomial sized marginalLP :
maxx,z,ct z
subject to z ≤ U(x, t) ∀t
ns ≤ x[S] ≤ NS ∀S and xi,j ≥ 0 ∀i, j
But, as stated earlier conv(P ) ⊂ MgS, and hence the so-
lution to the optimization above may not be implementable
as a valid mixed strategy. In our approximation approach we
1We remark that modeling-wise the extension to general-sum
case, non-linearity in probabilities or exponentially many targets
is straightforward; here we restrict the model as it suffices for the
domains we consider. See online appendix for the extension.
will solve the above marginalLP as the first step obtaining
marginal solution xm.
Bayesian Extension2: We also consider the following
simple extension where we consider types of adversary θ ∈
Θ and each adversary type θ attacks a set of targets Tθ such
that Tθ ∩ Tθ′ = φ for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. The adversary is of type
θ with probability pθ (
∑
θ pθ = 1). Then, the exact SSE
optimization can be written as: maxx,zθ,ai pθzθ subject to
zθ ≤ Ud(x, t) ∀θ ∀t ∈ Tθ and x =
∑
i:Pi∈P aiPi. A corre-
sponding marginalLP can be defined in exactly the same
way as for original ARA. Next, we show how the FAMS and
TSG domain are instances of this abstract ARA model and
Bayesian ARA respectively.
Implementability: Viewing the defender’s action space
as a randomized allocation provides an easy way to char-
acterize non-implementability of mixed strategies across a
wide range of SSGs, in contrast to prior work that have
identified non-implementability for specific cases (Korzhyk,
Conitzer, and Parr 2010; Letchford and Conitzer 2013;
Brown et al. 2016) . The details of this interpretation can
be found in the Appendix.
3.1 FAMS
We model zero-sum FAMS in the ARA model. The FAMS
problem is to allocate federal air marshal (FAMS) to flights
to and from US in order to prevent hijacking attacks. The
allocation is constrained by the number of FAMS available
and the fact that each FAMS must be scheduled on round
trips that take them back to their home airport. Thus, the
main technical complication arises from the presence of
schedules. A schedule is a subset of flights that has to be
defended together, e.g., flight f1 and f2 should be defended
together as they form a round trip for the air marshal. Air
marshals are allocated to schedules, no flight can have more
than one air marshal and some schedules cannot be defended
by some air marshals. The adversary attacks a flight.
Then, we capture the FAMS domain in the above model
by mapping schedules in FAMS to objects (on columns) and
air marshal in FAMS to assets (on rows). See Figure 1 for
an illustrative example. The assignment constraints include
the constraint for each resource i:
∑
j xi,j ≤ 1, which states
that every resource can be assigned at most once. If an air
marshal i cannot be assigned to schedule j then add the con-
straint xi,j = 0. A target t in the abstract model maps to
a flight f in FAMS, and the set T are all the indexes for
all schedules that include this flight: {(i, j) | flight f is in
schedule j}. The constraint that a flight cannot have more
than one air marshal is captured by adding the target allo-
cation constraint x[T ] ≤ 1. The probability of defending a
target (flight) is ct = x[T ], hence the weights wi,j’s in ARA
are all ones.
2Typically player types denotes different utilities but as
Harsanyi (1967) originally formulated, types capture any incom-
plete information including, as for our case, the lack of information
about the action space of adversary. The game is still zero-sum.
3.2 TSG
We model TSGs using the Bayesian formulation of ARA.
The TSG problem is how to allocate screening resources to
screenees in order to screen optimally, which we elaborate
in the context of airline passenger screening. In TSGs, dif-
ferent TSG resources such as X-Rays, Metal Detector act
in teams to inspect an airline passenger. The possible teams
are given. Passengers are further grouped into passenger cat-
egories with a given Nc number of passengers in each cat-
egory c. The allocation is of resource teams to passenger
categories. There are resource capacity constraints for each
resource usage (not on teams but on each resource). Further,
all passengers need to be screened. Each resource team i has
an effectiveness Ei < 1 of catching the adversary. Observe
that, unlike SSGs, the allocation in TSGs is not just binary
{0, 1} but any positive integer within the constraints. The
passenger category c is a tuple of risk level and flight (r, f);
the adversary’s action is to choose the flight f but he is prob-
abilistically assigned his risk level.
Then, we capture the TSG domain in the above abstract
model by mapping passenger categories in TSGs to objects
(on columns) and resource teams in TSGs to assets (on
rows). See Figure 1 for an illustrative example. The capacity
constraint for each resource r is captured by specifying the
constraint x[S] ≤ NS which contains all indexes of teams
that are formed using the given resource r: S = {(i, j) |
team i is formed using resource r} with NS equal to the
resource capacity bound for resource r. For every passen-
ger category j, the constraint
∑
i xi,j = Nj enforces that
all passengers are screened. A target t in TSG is simply a
passenger category j, thus, the set T is {(i, j) | j is given
passenger category}. The probability of detecting an adver-
sary in category j is given by
∑
(i,j)∈T Eixi,j/Nj , hence the
weightswi,j areEi/Nj ; sinceEi < 1 it is easy to check that∑
(i,j)∈T wi,jxi,j ≤ 1 for any T . The adversary type is the
risk level r, and each type r of adversary can choose a flight
f , thus, choosing a target which is the passenger category
(r, f). The probability of the adversary having a particular
risk level is given.
4 Computation Complexity
In this section, we explore the hardness of approximation
for ARAs, FAMS and TSGs. In prior work on computation
complexity of SSGs, researchers (Xu 2016) have focused on
hardness of exact computation providing general results re-
lating the hardness of defender best response (DBR) prob-
lem (defined below) to the hardness of exact SSE computa-
tion. In contrast, we relate the hardness of approximation of
the DBR problem to hardness of approximation of ARAs.
We also prove that special cases of ARA such as FAMS and
TSGs are also hard to approximate.
First, we formally state the equilibrium computation prob-
lem in adversarial randomized allocation: given the assets,
objects and assignment constraints of an adversarial ran-
domized allocation problem as input, output the SSE util-
ity and a set of pure strategies P1, . . . , Pm and probabilities
p1, . . . , pm that represents the SSE mixed strategy. We re-
strict m to be polynomial in the input size. This is natural,
since a polynomial time algorithm cannot produce an expo-
nential size output. Also, as discussed in prior literature (Xu
2016) the size of the support set of any mixed strategy is one
more than the dimension of any pure strategy, which is the
poly kn+ 1 in our case.
Next, as has been defined in prior literature (Xu 2016), we
state the defender best response (DBR) problem which will
help in understanding the results. The DBR problem can be
interpreted as the defender’s best response to a given mixed
strategy of the adversary. The DBR problem also shows up
naturally as the slave problem in column generation based
approaches to SSGs. While it is easy to show the hardness of
approximation of given DBR problems, the question of how
its relates to the hardness of approximation of SSE compu-
tation is open.
Definition 1. The DBR problem is maxx∈P d · x where d
is a vector of positive constants. DBR is a combinatorial
problem that takes the assignment constraints as inputs, and
not P .
Next, we state the standard definition of approximation
Definition 2. An algorithm for a maximization problem is
r-approximate if it provides a feasible solution with value at
least OPT/r, where OPT is the exact maximum value.
Note that lower r means better approximation. Depend-
ing on the best r possible, optimization problems are clas-
sified into various approximation complexity classes with
increasing hardness of approximation in the following or-
der PTAS, APX, log-APX, and poly-APX. We extensively
use the well-known approximation preserving AP reduction
between optimization problems for our results. We do not
delve into the formal definition of complexity classes or AP
reduction here due to lack of space and these concepts being
standard (Ausiello et al. 1999). Our first result shows that
the ARA’s approximation complexity is same as that of the
DBR problem and in the worst case cannot be approximated.
Theorem 1. The following hardness of approximation re-
sults hold for ARA problems
• ARA problems cannot be approximated by any bounded
factor in polynomial time, unless P = NP .
• If the DBR problem for given ARA problem lies in some
given approximation class (PTAS, APX, log-APX, poly-
APX), then so does the ARA problem.
Proof Sketch. The first result works by constructing a ARA
from a NP hard unweighted (d = 1) DBR problem such that
the feasibility of the constructed ARA solves the DBR prob-
lem, thereby ruling out any approximation. Such unweighted
DBR problems exist (for example for FAMS). The second
part of the proof works by constructing an ARA problem
with one target and showing that the solution yields an ap-
proximate value for a relaxed DBR with x ∈ conv(P ).
Moreover, this solution is an expectation over integral points
(pure strategies), thus, at least one integral point in the sup-
port set output by ARA also provides an approximation for
the corresponding combinatorial DBR.
Algorithm 1: Abstract Approximation
1 forall S ∈ EqualityConstraints do
2 x← CombSample(xm, S)
3 x← FixV iolatedInequalityConstraints(x)
4 x← FixEqualityConstraints(x)
As the above complexity result is a worst case analysis,
one may wonder whether the above result holds for sub-
classes of ARA problems. We show that strong versions of
inapproximatibility also holds for FAMS and TSGs.
Theorem 2. TSGs cannot be approximated to any logarith-
mic factor in poly time, unless P=NP.
Theorem 3. FAMS problems cannot be approximated to any
logarithmic factor in poly time, unless P=NP.
Both the proofs above use AP reduction from max inde-
pendent set. The proof for TSG follows from an observa-
tion that a special case of the TSG problem is the indepen-
dent set problem itself, thus, any approximation for TSGs
can provide an equivalent approximation for the max inde-
pendent set problem. The proof for FAMS is much more
involved. It involves constructing a poly number of FAMS
instance (with varying number of resources) given any in-
dependent set problem. The FAMS instances are such that
pure strategies corresponds to independent sets and the mul-
tiple instances are constructed such that the optimal exact
solution for one of these instances provides a solution for
the max independent set problem. Then, it is shown that any
approximation r for the FAMS problem yields at least one
pure strategy (over all the FAMS instances) that corresponds
to a better than r approximation for the max independent set
problem, thereby completing the AP reduction. See the sup-
plementary material for details.
5 Approximation approach
Our approach to approximation first solves the
marginalLP , which is quite fast in practice (see ex-
periments) and provides an upper bound to the true value of
the game. Then, we sample from the marginal solution, but
unlike previous work (Tsai et al. 2010), we alter the sampled
value to ensure that the final pure strategy output is valid.
We describe an abstract sampling and alteration approach
for ARA in this part, which we instantiate for FAMS
and TSGs in the subsequent sub-sections. Recall that a
constraint is given by an index set S and the constraint is an
equality if nS = NS . For our abstract approach we restrict
our attention to ARAs with partitioned equality assignment
constraints, which means the index set S for all equality
constraints partitions the index set {1, . . . , k} × {1, . . . , n}
of the allocation matrix. Further, for inequality constraints
we assume nS = 0. Call these problems as PE0-ARA; this
class still includes FAMS and TSGs. For FAMS, which does
not have equality constraints, we use dummy schedules si to
get partitioned equalities
∑
j xi,j + si = 1; si = 1 denotes
that resource i is unallocated. Our abstract approximation
approach for PE0-ARA is presented in Algorithm 1.
The Algorithm takes as input the marginal solution xm
from marginalLP and produces a pure strategy. The first
for loop (line 1-2) performs comb sampling for each equal-
ity constraint S to produce integral values for the variables
involved in S. Comb sampling was introduced in an earlier
paper (Tsai et al. 2010); it provides the guarantee that xmi,j is
rounded up or down for all (i, j) ∈ S, the sample xi,j has
expected value E(xi,j) = xmi,j for all (i, j) ∈ S and equality
S is still satisfied after the sampling. See Figure 2 for an ex-
ample. Briefly, comb sampling works by creating Z buckets
of length one each, where Z =
∑
(i,j)∈S{xmi,j}, where {.}
denotes fractional part. Each of the {xmi,j} length fraction is
packed into the bucket (in any order and some of the {xmi,j}
fraction may have to be split into two buckets), then a num-
ber between [0, 1] is sampled randomly, say z, and for each
bucket a mark is put at length z. Finally, the (i, j) whose
{xmi,j} fraction lies on the marker z for each bucket is cho-
sen to be rounded up, and all other xmi,j are rounded down.
Observe that in expectation the output of comb sampling
matches the marginal solution, thus, providing the same ex-
pected utility as the marginal solution. Recall that this ex-
pected utility is an upper bound on the optimal utility. How-
ever, the samples from comb sampling may not be valid pure
strategies. Thus, in case the output of comb sampling is not
already valid, the two abstract methods in line 3 and 4 mod-
ify the sample strategy by first decreasing the integral val-
ues to satisfy the violated inequalities and then increasing
the integral values to satisfy the equalities. Such modifica-
tion of the sampled strategy to obtain a valid strategy is
guided by the principle that the change in defender utility
between the sampled and the resultant valid strategy should
be small, which ensures that change in expected utility from
the marginal solution due to the modification is small. As the
expected utility of the marginal solution is an upper bound
on the optimal expected utility this marginal expected utility
guided modification leads the output expected utility to be
close to the optimal utility.
These two methods on line 3 and 4 are instantiated with
domain specific heuristics that implement the principle of
marginal expected utility guided modification. Below, we
show the instantiation for the TSG and FAMS domains. A
sample execution of the above approach for TSGs is shown
in Figure 2.
5.1 TSG
The heuristics for TSG are guided by three observations: (1)
more effective resources are more constrained in their usage,
(2) changing allocation for passenger categories with higher
number of passengers changes the probability of detection of
adversary by a smaller amount than changing allocation for
category with fewer passengers and (3) higher risk passenger
categories typically have lower number of passengers.
Recall that for TSGs the inequalities are resource capac-
ity constraints. Thus, for fixing violated inequalities we need
to decrease allocation which decreases utility; we wish to
keep the utility decrease small as that ensures that the ex-
pected utility does not move much further away from the up-
per bound marginal expected utility. Our approach for such
decrease in allocation has the following steps: (a) prioritize
fixing inequality of most violated resources first and (b) for
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Figure 2: (Left to right) Sample execution for TSG: This uses the
same TSG example as in Figure 1. The marginal solution is the
leftmost matrix which after CombSampling on each column be-
comes integral, e.g., 0.5 in the left column is rounded down to 0
and 1.5 rounded up to 2. Note that the CombSampling output sat-
isfies all equalities, but exceeds the resource capacity 7 for X-ray.
Next, allocation values are lowered (shown as red circle) to satisfy
the X-Ray capacity but the equality constraint on third column gets
violated. Next, allocation values are increased (again red circle) to
fix the equality and that produces a valid pure strategy.
each such inequality we attempt to lower allocation for pas-
senger category with higher number of passengers. In light
of the observations for TSG above this approach aims to
keep the change in expected utility small. Specifically, ob-
servation 1 makes it likely that constraints for more effective
resources are fixed in step a above. Observation 3 suggests
that the changes in step b happens for lower risk passen-
gers. Thus, step a aims to keep the allocation of effective
resources for high risk passengers unchanged. This keeps
the utility change small as changing allocation for high risk
passengers can change utility by a large amount. Next, by
observation 2, step b aims to minimize the change in prob-
ability of detecting the adversary by a low amount so that
expected utility change in small. For example in Figure 2,
the inequality fix reduces the allocation for the third passen-
ger category (column) which also has the highest number of
passengers (15).
Next, the equalities in TSGs are the constraints for every
passenger category. For fixing equalities we need to increase
allocation which increases utility; we wish to keep this util-
ity increase high as it brings the expected utility closer to
the upper bound marginal expected utility. Here we aim to
do so by (a) prioritizing increase of allocation for categories
with fewer people and (b) increasing allocation of those re-
sources that have least slack in their resource capacity con-
straint (low slack could mean higher effectiveness). By Ob-
servation 1 low slack means that resource could be more
effective and by Observation 2 fewer people means higher
risk passengers. This ensures that higher risk passengers are
screened more using more effective resources thereby rais-
ing the utility maximally. For example in Figure 2, the equal-
ity for the third column is fixed by using the only available
resource MD.
Recall that TSGs differs from FAMS in that the alloca-
tion for TSGs can be non-binary. This offers an advantage
for TSGs with respect to approximation, as small fractional
changes in allocation do not change the overall allocation
by much (0.5 to 1 is a 50% change in FAMS, but 4.5 to 5
is less than 10% change for TSGs). Thus, we assume here
that the changes due to Algorithm 1 do not reduce the prob-
ability of detecting an adversary in any passenger category
(from the marginal solution) by more than 1/c factor, where
c > 1 is a constant. This restriction is realistic as it is very
unlikely that any passenger category will have few passen-
gers and we only aim to change the allocation for passenger
categories with a higher number of passengers. Hence we
prove the following
Theorem 4. Assume that Algorithm 1 always successfully
outputs a pure strategy and the change in allocation from
the marginal strategy does not change the probability of de-
tecting an adversary by more than 1/c factor. Then, the ap-
proximation approach above with the heuristic provides a
c-approximation for TSGs.
As a remark, the above result does not violate the inap-
proximatability of TSGs since the above result holds for a
restricted set of TSG problems. Also, the approximation for
TSGs may sometimes fail to yield a valid pure strategy as
satisfying the equalities may become impossible after us-
ing certain sequences of decreasing allocation. In our ex-
periments we observe that the failure of obtaining a pure
strategy after Algorithm 1 is rare and also easily handled
by repeating the approximation approach with a new sample
(approximation runs in milli-secs).
5.2 FAMS
Recall that for FAMS the inequalities are the target alloca-
tion constraints: x[T ] ≤ 1 and fixing violations for these
involves decreasing allocation. Our heuristic is simple: the
variables xi,j are set to zero (i.e., decreased) starting from
those schedules j that contain the most number of targets
for which target allocation constraint is violated and do not
contain any target for which the target allocation constraint
is satisfied. We can guarantee to find a decrease in allocation
that satisfies the constraint for T without changing the allo-
cation for targets that already satisfy constraints in the cases
when the target T with violated constraint (1) belongs to a
schedule j that exclusively contains that target T (xi,j can
be decreased without affecting any other constraint) or (2) T
belongs to only one schedule (all other targets in this sched-
ule will violate their constraints). This approach ensures that
we only work to fix the violated constraints and cause a min-
imal change in utility by leaving the satisfied constraints
undisturbed. However, if in fixing a violated target alloca-
tion constraint for T it becomes necessary to reduce alloca-
tion for another already satisfied target constraint, then sam-
ple uniformly from the ≥ 2 schedules that T belongs to in
order to choose the xi,j allocation to reduce. Do this till all
inequality constraints are satisfied.
Then, we do nothing to fix equality constraints since we
have only decreased xi,j and if any equality
∑
j xi,j+si = 1
is not satisfied we can always set the dummy si to be one.
Also, observe that since we only always decrease alloca-
tions, we always find a pure strategy for any sample from
Algorithm 1 (unlike TSGs). We prove the following:
Theorem 5. Let Ct be the number of targets that share a
schedule with any target t, and C = maxt Ct. The approx-
imation approach above with the heuristic provides a 2Ck-
approximation for FAMS.
110
100
1000
10000
300 500 700
Ru
nt
im
e 
(s
ec
on
ds
)
Number of Flights
CG RAND
(a) Runtime (log-scale time)
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
300 500 700 900
De
fe
nd
er
 U
til
ity
Number of Flights
CG
RAND
(b) Solution quality
Figure 3: ASPEN and RAND Comparison
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
10 30 50 70 90 110 120
R
u
n
ti
m
e 
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
Number of Flights
MGA
RAND
(a) Runtime (log-scale time)
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
10 30 50 70 90 110 120
R
u
n
ti
m
e 
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
Number of Flights
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
10 30 50 70 90 110
D
ef
en
d
er
 U
ti
lit
y
Number of Flights
MGA
RAND
(b) Solution quality
Figure 4: MGA and RAND Comparison
Next, we show experimental results that reveal the aver-
age case loss of our approximation approach (as opposed to
the worst case approximation guarantees in this section).
6 Experimental Results
Our set of experiments provide a comprehensive analysis of
our randomized approach, which we name RAND. We com-
pare RAND to the best know solver for TSGs called MGA;
MGA (Brown et al. 2016) has been previously shown to
outperform column generation based approaches by a large
margin. For the FAMS problem the best known solver in lit-
erature for the general sum case is called the ASPEN (Jain
et al. 2010), which is a column generation based branch
and price approach. Through private communication with
the company (Avata Intelligence) managing the FAMS soft-
ware, we know the FAMS problem is solved as a zero-sum
problem for scalability and takes hours to complete. For our
zero-sum case we implemented a plain column generation
(CG) solver for FAMS, since branch and price is an overkill
for the zero sum case. All results in this section are averaged
over 30 randomly generated game instances. All game in-
stances fix U ts to −1 and randomly select U tu from integers
between−2 and−10. The utility for RAND is computed by
generating 1000 pure strategies and taking their average as
an estimate of the defender mixed strategy. All experiments
were run using a system with Xeon 2.6 GHz processor and
4GB RAM.
For FAMS, we vary the number of flights, keeping the
number of resources fixed at 10 and number of schedules
fixed at 1000 and 5 targets/schedule. The runtime in log
scale is shown in Figure 3. CG hits the 60 min cut-off for 700
flights and the run time for RAND is much lower at only a
few seconds. Next, we report the solution quality for RAND
by comparing with the solution using CG. It can be seen that
the solution gets better with increasing flights starting from
19% loss at 300 flights to 5% loss at 900 flights. Thus, the
numbers show that we obtain large speed-ups up to factor
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Figure 5: Scalability of RAND
of 1000x and are still able to extract 95% utility for higher
number of flights when the CG approach starts taking huge
amount of time.
For TSGs, we used six passenger risk levels, eight screen-
ing resource types and 20 screening team types. We vary
the number of fights and we also randomly sample the team
structure (how teams are formed from resources) for each
of the 30 runs. The results in Figure 4 show runtime (in
log scale) and defender utility values varying with number
of flights (on x-axis). As can be seen, MGA only scales up
to 110 flights before hitting the cut-off of 60 mins, while
RAND takes only 10 sec for 110 flights. Also, the solu-
tion quality loss for RAND has a maximum averaged loss of
1.49%. Thus, we obtain at-least 360X speed-ups with very
minor loss.
Finally, we test the scalability of RAND for FAMS and
TSG, shown in Figure 5. As can be seen, the runtime for
RAND is low even with the highest number of flights we
tested: 280 for TSG and 3500 for FAMS. The maximum
runtime for FAMS was under 5 seconds. With TSGs the
maximum runtime was under 25 secs. Overall, these results
demonstrate the scalability of our approach with minor solu-
tion quality loss on average. Importantly, the scalability re-
sults shows that RAND can solve the FAMS and TSG prob-
lem for sizes that are required for a US wide deployment,
and the results also provide evidence that further scalability
with increasing number of flights is also possible. This also
provides evidence that approximations is a viable approach
to solving zero-sum SSGs at a large scale.
7 Conclusion
We studied approximations in SSGs both theoretically and
practically. In fact, while our paper title talks about half a
loaf (optimal solution), we practically obtain up to 97% of
the loaf (optimal solution). We obtain 1000x speedups with
losses within 5%. Thus, approximations open the door to
solving very large scale zero-sum SSGs and we believe that
we have laid a fertile ground for future research in approx-
imating large scale zero-sum security games. Our approach
also provided an avenue to solve the real world FAMS and
airport screening problem in order to increase the scope of
applicability of these already deployed application (in case
of FAMS) or applications under test (airport screening).
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A Appendix
A.1 ARA complex model
It is easy to change the probability to be ct =
f({xi,j | (i, j) ∈ T}) so that the probability is non-linear (as
given by f) in the entries. Also, clearly increasing number of
targets to be large is allowed as targets can be any subset
of the indexes. A general sum variant can also be stated by
specifying the adversary utilities in terms of ct. Of course,
as in SSGs, the general sum case cannot be written as a LP
but can be written as multiple optimizations or a MILP.
A.2 Implementability
Viewing SSGs as ARAs provides an easy way of determin-
ing implementability using results from randomized alloca-
tion (Budish et al. 2013). First, we define bi-hierarchical as-
signment constraints as those that can be partitioned into two
sets H1, H2 such that two constraints S, S′ in the same par-
tition (H1 or H2) it is the case that either S ⊆ S′ or S′ ⊆ S
or S ∩ S′ = φ. Then, we obtain the following sufficiency
result
Proposition 1. All marginal strategies are implementable,
or more formally conv(P ) = MgS, if the assignment con-
straints are bi-hierarchical.
Proof. The proof is just an application of Thm 1 in (Budish
et al. 2013).
In contrast to prior work that have identified cases of
non-implementability (Korzhyk, Conitzer, and Parr 2010;
Letchford and Conitzer 2013; Brown et al. 2016) for spe-
cific cases, this provides an easy way to characterize non-
implementability across a wide range of SSGs. As Fig-
ure 1 reveals, both FAMS and TSG have non-implementable
marginals due to overlapping constraints. Next, as defined
in (Budish et al. 2013), canonical assignment constraints are
those that impose constraints on all rows and columns of the
matrix (with possibly additional constraints), using which
we obtain the following necessity result
Proposition 2. Given canonical assignment constraints, if
all marginal strategies are implementable then the assign-
ment constraints are bi-hierarchical.
Proof. The proof is just an application of 2 in (Budish et al.
2013).
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. For the first part, given any ARA problem with a NP
hard DBR-U instance (for the decision version of DBR-U),
we construct another ARA instance such that the feasibility
problem for that ARA instance solves the DBR-U decision
problem. Thus, as the feasibility is NP Hard, there exists
no approximation. First, since ARA problem is so general
there exists DBR-U problems that are NP Hard. For exam-
ple the DBR-U problem for FAMS has been shown to be
NP Hard (Xu 2016). Given the hard DBR-U problem, form
an ARA problem with by adding the constraint 1 · x = k.
Also, let there be only one target t in the problem, so that the
objective becomes U(x, t) insted of z and all constraints in
the optimization are just the marginal space constraints and
1 · x = k. Now, the existence of any solution of the opti-
mization gives a feasible point as x =
∑
m amxm, where
the integral points xm is solution to the question of does
there exist a solution of the DBR-U optimization problem
with value k. Next, a binary search on k can answer the de-
cision DBR-U problem of whether there exists a solution for
decision DBR-U with value ≥ k. Thus, existence of any so-
lution for ARA is NP Hard, thus, no approximation is easy.
For the second part, we present a AP approximation pre-
serving reduction (with problem mapping that doe not de-
pend on approximation ratio); such a reduction preserves
membership in PTAS, APX, log-APX, Poly-APX (see ).
Given any DBR problem, we construct the ARA problem
with one target such that T = {1, . . . , k} × {1, . . . , n}.
Choose the weights wi,j’s such that wi,j ∝ di,j and wi,j ≤
1/maxx∈MgS
∑
i,j xi,j . Observe that maxx∈MgS
∑
i,j xi,j
is computable efficiently and maxx∈MgS
∑
i,j xi,j ≥
maxx∈conv(P )
∑
i,j xi,j , thus, the ARA is well-defined.
Thus, due to just one target, the ARA optimization is same
as maxx∈conv(P )w · x. Suppose we can solve this problem
with r approximation with the solution mixed strategy be-
ing x =
∑m
i=1 aixi for some pure strategies xi. Now, since
wi,j ∝ di,j we also know that this solution also provides
r approximation for DBR-C. Let the optimal solution for
DBR-C be OPT ; note that OPT is also the optimal solu-
tion for DBR. x provides a solution valuew·x ≥ OPT/r.
Further, as the objective is linear in x and x =
∑m
i=1 aiPi,
it must be the case that there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such
that w · Pj ≥ w · x ≥ OPT/r. Thus, since Pj ∈ P , Pj
provides r approximation for DBR. Since, m the number of
the pure strategies in support of x is polynomial, Pj can be
found in polynomial time by a linear search.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Given an independent set problem with V vertices,
we construct a TSG with {1, . . . , V + 1} team types, where
each team type in 1, . . . , V corresponds to a vertex. The
V +1 team is special in the sense that it does not correspond
to any vertex and it is made up of just one resource with a
very large resource capacity 2V . Construct just one passen-
ger category with passengersN = V +1. Since, there is just
one passenger category (and target) we will use xi as the ma-
trix entries instead of xi,j . Choose U ts = V + 1 and U
t
u = 0
and efficiencies Ei = 1 for all teams, except EV+1 = 0.
Then, the objective of the integer LP is
∑V
i=1 xi = 1V · x
where 1V is a vector with first V components as 1 and last
component as 0.
Next, have resources for every edge (i, k) ∈ E
with resource capacity 1. This provides the inequality∑
(i,k)∈E xi + xj ≤ 1. Also, we have xV+1 ≤ 2V .
Inspection of every passengers provides the constraints∑V+1
i=1 xi = V + 1. Treating xV+1 as a slack, we can see
that the constraint xV+1 ≤ 2V and
∑V+1
i=1 xi = V + 1 are
redundant. For the left over constraints
∑
(i,k)∈E xi + xj ≤
1, we can easily check that any valid integral assignment
(pure strategy) is an independent set. Moreover, the objec-
tive
∑V
i=1 xi tries to maximize the independent set. The op-
timal value of this optimization over conv(P ) is an extreme
point which is integral and equal to the maximum indepen-
dent set OPT. Thus, suppose a solution x to the SSE prob-
lem with value ≥ OPT/r. Further, as the objective is linear
in x and x =
∑m
i=1 aiPi, it must be the case that there ex-
ists a j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that 1V ·Pj ≥ 1V ·x ≥ OPT/r.
Thus, since Pj ∈ P , Pj provides r approximation for max-
imum independent set. Since, m the number of the pure
strategies in support of x is polynomial, Pj can be found
in polynomial time by a linear search.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. We provide an AP reduction from independent set.
As max independent set is poly APX complete, this rules
out any log factor approximation.
Given an independent set maximization problem with ver-
tices V and edges E construct the following FAMS prob-
lems, one for each k. Use 2n−k resources. All resources can
be assigned to any schedule. Construct schedules s1, . . . , sn
corresponding to the vertices v1, . . . , vn. Construct target te
corresponding to every edge e = (u, v) such that te ∈ su
and te ∈ sv . All te’s have the same value for being de-
fended or undefended and that value is n + 2; thus, these
targets do not need to covered but impose the constraint that
su and sv cannot be simultaneously defended. Thus, it is
clear that any allocation of resources to s1, . . . , sn corre-
sponds to an independent set. Next, consider additional 2n
targets and expand the schedules such that ti, ti+1 ∈ si.
Further, add more singleton schedules sn+1, . . . , s3n with
ti ∈ sn+i. All additional targets t1, . . . , t2n provide value
k when defended and k − 2n otherwise. Thus, the expected
utility of defending an additional target t given coverage ct
is ct(k) + (1− ct)(k − 2n) = 2n ∗ ct + k − 2n.
First, assume we have a poly time algorithm to approxi-
mately compute the SSE with approx factor r (r > 1). We
will run this poly time algorithm with resources 2 to 2n− 1
which is again a poly time overall, and also the overall out-
put size is poly. For the given max independent set prob-
lem, let the solution be k∗. Observe that for problems with
resources 2n − k where k ≤ k∗, all valuable (additional)
targets can be covered by covering k∗ schedules with 2k∗
targets in s1, . . . , sn and using the remaining ≥ 2n − 2k∗
resources to cover the remaining 2n− 2k∗ targets. This pro-
vides utility of k for the SSE. In particular, the utility with
2n − k∗ resources is k∗. Also note that for every problem,
there is always a trivial allocation of 2n− k resources to the
2n singleton schedules such that coverage of each target is
1 − k/2n. (this is deducible as the allocation to singleton
schedules is unconstrained and can be implemented in poly
time by Birkhoff-von Neumann result as provided in (Ko-
rzhyk, Conitzer, and Parr 2010)). This trivial allocation pro-
vides an utility 0.
Also the following result will be useful: given approxi-
mation factor r for the case with 2n − k∗ resources then
one of the pure strategy output for this case will have at
least k∗ − lmin schedules among s1, . . . , sn covered where
lmin = bargminl k∗k∗−l > rc. Before proving the above note
that by definition k
∗
k∗−lmin−1 > r and
k∗
k∗−lmin < r.
To prove the result in last paragraph consider the contra-
positive: suppose all pure strategies output cover at most
k∗− lmin−1 schedules among s1, . . . , sn, then in each pure
strategy at least lmin + 1 targets are not covered (since 2 tar-
gets are covered for the k∗ − lmin − 1 schedules and rest of
resources can cover only 1 target). Then the coverage of the
least covered target in the mixed strategy formed using such
pure strategies is ≤ 1 − (lmin + 1)/2n. The utility for this
least covered target is ≤ k∗ − lmin − 1. The overall utility
has to be lower than utility for any target, hence the utility is
≤ k∗−lmin−1. The optimal utility is k∗. Thus, by definition
of approximation ratio r we must have k∗− lmin−1 ≥ k∗/r
or re-arranging k
∗
k∗−lmin−1 ≤ r but by definition of lmin we
must have k
∗
k∗−lmin−1 > r hence a contradiction.
The above result also shows that at least one pure strat-
egy yields an independent set of size k∗ − lmin. As k∗ is
the max size of independent sets we obtain and approxima-
tion ratio r′ for the max independent set problem such that
r′ < k
∗
k∗−lmin < r. Thus, we obtain a better approximation
r′ given r approximation for the SSE. Thus, we have an AP
reduction.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Proof. Consider the event of a target t having an infeasible
assignment after the comb sampling. Call this event Et. Let
Ct,i be the event that resource i covers this target t. Then,
P (Et) =
∑
i P (Et|Ct,i)P (Ct,i). From the guarantees of
comb sampling we know that P (Ct,i) =
∑
j:(i,j)∈T x
m
i,j ≤
1 and P (xi,j = 1) = xmi,j . Also, by comb sampling if
xi,j = 1 then xi,j′ = 0 for any j′ 6= j. Next, we know
that P (Et|Ct,i) is the probability that the any of the other
xi′,j is assigned a one, which is 1− the probability that all
other xi′,j are assigned 0. Thus,
P (Et|Ct,i) = 1−
∏
i′ 6=i
(1− P (Ct,i))
Let pt,i = P (Ct,i). Considering the fact that
∏
i(1−pt,i) >
1−∑i pt,i, we get
1−
∏
i′ 6=i
(1−P (Ct,i)) ≤
∑
(i′,j):i′ 6=i∧(i′,j)∈T
xmi′,j ≤ 1−
∑
j
xmi,j
where the last inequality is due to the fact that∑
(i,j)∈T x
m
i,j ≤ 1.
Thus, P (Et) ≤
∑
i(1− pt,i)pt,i ≤
∑
i pt,i −
∑
i(pt,i)
2.
Next, we know from standard sum of squares inequality that∑
i(pi)
2 ≥ (∑i pi)2/k. Thus, we getP (Et) ≤ (∑i pi)(1−∑
i pi/k) The RHS is maximized when
∑
i pi = 1, thus,
P (Et) ≤ 1− 1/k. Also, then P (¬Et) ≥ 1/k
Now consider the coverage of target t: xmt =∑
(i,j)∈T x
m
i,j . According to our algorithm the allocation for
target t continues to remain 1 with probability (1/2)C if
its allocation is already feasible after comb sampling (and
we always obtain a pure strategy). This is because this tar-
get shares schedules with C other targets and thus in the
worst case may be reduced with 1/2 probability for each
of the C targets. We do a worst case analysis and assume
that no resource is allocated to a target when the sampled
allocation is infeasible for that target. Thus, let yt denote
the random variable denoting that target t is covered. Thus,
E(yt) = P (yt = 1) = P (yt = 1|Et)P (Et) + P (yt =
1|¬Et)P (¬Et). Now, P (yt = 1|¬Et) is same as xmt /2C
and we assumed the worst case of P (yt = 1|Et) = 0. Thus,
we have E(yt) ≥ xmt /2Ck. As the utilities are linear in yt,
we have the utility for t as Ut ≥ Umt /2Ck, where Umt is
the utility under the marginal xm. Thus, if t∗ is the choice
of adversary under the marginal xm we know that Umt∗ is
the lowest utility for the defender over all targets t. Hence,
we can conclude that the utility with the approximation is at
least Umt∗ /2
Ck
Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. The main assumption in the proof is that the steps af-
ter after comb sampling changes the probability of detecting
an adversary in passenger category j by at most 1/c. Also,
by assumption of the theorem since Algorithm 1 does not
fail ever, the change in utility for any passenger category j
is at most a factor of 1/c. By similar reasoning as for FAMS,
we conclude that this provides a c-approximation.
